Health Law Advisor

Today, on April 29, 2024, following more than a decade of discourse, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA” or the “Agency”) released its long-awaited “Medical Devices; Laboratory Developed Tests” Final Rule (the “Final Rule”) formalizing the Agency’s authority to regulate laboratory developed tests (“LDTs”) as medical devices.

Since FDA issued its Proposed Rule (the “Proposed Rule”) in the Fall of 2023, Epstein Becker Green (EBG) and other industry stakeholders have eagerly awaited FDA’s issuance of the Final Rule and have speculated as to the provisions the Agency would choose to finalize.

Now, with the wait finally over, EBG joins the rest of industry in our review of the Final Rule, and we will be preparing a more in-depth analysis of the Final Rule and its potential impact on laboratories and the nationwide healthcare system. For now, here are important preliminary takeaways from the Final Rule.

As of Monday March 4, 2024—just three months after the end of its comment period on December 4, 2023—FDA’s rule on regulation of laboratory developed tests (“LDTs”) as medical devices is under review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). While review by OIRA is capped at 90 days by Executive Order 12866, there is no minimum period required, and therefore action can be taken any time between now and June.

During this election year, FDA’s efforts to push the rule forward fairly quickly is ...

Six months from the date of closing. That’s how long acquiring companies have under the newly announced Department of Justice (DOJ) Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Safe Harbor Policy to disclose misconduct discovered in the context of a merger or acquisition – whether discovered pre or post-acquisition.  And the acquiring company has one year from the date of closing to remediate, as well as provide restitution to any victims and disgorge  any profits.

Over the last two years, the DOJ has made clear its priority to encourage companies to self-disclose misconduct aiming to ...

On June 1, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously settled a long-standing dispute over a subjective versus objective standard for scienter under the False Claims Act (FCA), holding that a defendant’s own subjective belief is relevant to scienter, rather than what an “objectively reasonable” person may have known or believed.

The case in question, U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., consolidated from two lower court decisions, involved allegations that the defendants, two retail pharmacy chains, overcharged the government for prescription drugs in violation of ...

In this episode of the Diagnosing Health Care Podcast:  While the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be moving into our rearview mirror, government investigations and enforcement actions targeting COVID-19-related fraud are just starting to heat up.

What can businesses do to prevent or mitigate potential civil and criminal charges in this area?

On September 30, 2021, the federal Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services issued “Requirements Related to Surprise Billing; Part II,” the second in a series of interim final regulations (the “Second NSA Rules”) implementing the No Surprises Act (“NSA”). This new federal law became effective for services on or after January 1, 2022.

Earlier this summer, Ethan P. Davis, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) delivered remarks addressing DOJ’s top priorities for enforcement actions related to COVID-19 and indicating that DOJ plans to “vigorously pursue fraud and other illegal activity.”[1] As discussed below, Davis’s remarks not only highlighted principles that will guide enforcement efforts of the Civil Fraud Section under the False Claims Act (FCA) and of the Consumer Protection Branch (CPB) under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE), they also provide an indication of how DOJ might approach enforcement over the next few years.

DOJ'S KEY CONSIDERATIONS & ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY FOR COVID-19

Davis highlighted two key principles that would drive DOJ’s COVID-related enforcement efforts: the energetic use of “every enforcement tool available to prevent wrongdoers from exploiting the COVID-19 crisis” and a respect of the private sector’s critical role in ending the pandemic and restarting the economy.[2] Under that framework, DOJ plans to pursue fraud and other illegal activity under the FCA, which Davis characterizes as “one of the most effective weapons in [DOJ’s] arsenal.”[3]

However, as DOJ pursues FCA cases, it will also seek to affirmatively dismiss qui tam claims that  DOJ finds meritless or that interfere with agency policy and programs.[4] DOJ also plans to collect certain information from qui tam relators regarding third-party litigation funders during relator interviews.[5] DOJ’s emphasis on qui tam cases—cases brought under the FCA by relators or whistleblowers—for COVID-related enforcement highlights the impact such matters have on DOJ’s enforcement agenda.[6]

1. DOJ will consider dismissing cases that involve regulatory overreach and are not otherwise in the interest of the United States.

Although Davis emphasized that the majority of qui tam cases would be allowed to proceed, in order to “weed out” cases that lack merit or that DOJ believes should not proceed, DOJ will consider dismissing cases that “involve regulatory overreach or are otherwise not in the interest of the United States.”[7] This is consistent with the principles reflected in the 2018 Granston Memo that instructed DOJ attorneys to consider “whether the government’s interests are served” when considering whether cases should proceed and listed considerations for seeking alternative grounds for dismissal of FCA cases.[8] Davis gave examples throughout his speech of actions DOJ might consider dismissing:

• Cases based on immaterial or inadvertent mistakes, such as technical mistakes with paperwork
• Cases based on honest misunderstandings of rules, terms, and conditions
• Cases based on alleged deviations from non-binding guidance documents
• Cases against entities that reasonably attempted to comply with guidance and “in good faith took advantage of the regulatory flexibilities granted by federal agencies in the time of crisis.”[9]

DOJ litigators have been advised to inform relators of the possibility of dismissal.[10] Additionally, qui tam suits based on behaviors temporarily permitted during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in circumstances in which agencies exercised discretion to waive or not enforce certain requirements, might
“fail as a matter of law for lack of materiality and knowledge.”[11]

2. DOJ will now include a series of questions during relator interviews to identify third-party litigation funders.

During each relator interview, DOJ has instructed line attorneys to ask a series of questions to identify whether the relator or their counsel has a third-party litigation funding agreement,[12] which is an agreement in which a third party—such as a commercial lender or a hedge fund—finances the cost of litigation in return for a portion of recoveries.[13] Under the new policy detailed in Davis’s speech, if a third-party funder is disclosed, DOJ will ask for the following:

• the identity of the third-party litigation funder,
• information regarding whether information of the allegations has been shared with the third party,
• whether the relator or their counsel has a written agreement with the third party, and
• whether the agreement between the relator or their counsel and the third party includes terms that entitles the third-party funder to exercise direct or indirect control over the relator’s litigation or settlement decisions.

Relators must inform DOJ of changes as the case proceeds through the course of litigation.[14] While Davis characterizes these changes as a “purely information-gathering exercise for the purpose of studying the issues,” the questions are in furtherance of DOJ’s ongoing efforts to uncover the potential negative impacts third-party litigation financing may have in qui tam actions. [15] The questions Davis referenced in his remarks reflect DOJ’s concerns with third-party litigation funding as expressed by Deputy Associate Attorney General Stephen Cox in a January 2020 speech.[16] Davis emphasized that DOJ particularly sought to evaluate the extent to which third-party litigation funders were behind qui tam cases DOJ investigates, litigates, and monitors; the extent of information sharing with third-party funders; and the amount of control third-party funders exercised over the litigation and settlement decisions.[17] While the Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019 has remained inactive since its introduction in February 2019 by Senator Grassley[18] and the 2018 proposal by the U.S. Court’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rights’ Multidistrict Litigation Subcommittee to require disclosure of third-party litigation funding remains under consideration,[19] DOJ’s plans to include this line of questioning potentially signals DOJ’s intention to take more concrete and significant steps to address third-party litigation funding in the future.

In an important win for healthcare providers, on July 17, 2020, the Third Circuit determined in a published opinion that an out-of-network provider’s direct claims against an insurer for breach of contract and promissory estoppel are not pre-empted by ERISA.  In Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.^[1] In an issue of first impression, the Third Circuit addressed the question of what remedies are available to an out-of-network provider when an insurer initially agrees to pay for the provision of out-of-network services, and then breaches that agreement.

This case arose because two patients—identified as J.L. and D.W.—required medical procedures that were not available in-network through Aetna. J.L. needed bilateral breast reconstruction surgery following a double mastectomy and D.W. required “facial reanimation surgery,” which the Third Circuit describes as “a niche procedure performed by only a handful of surgeons in the United States.” Neither J.L. nor DW had out-of-network coverage for these procedures. D.W.’s plan also contained an “anti-assignment” clause, which would have prevented D.W. from assigning his or her rights under the plan to the Plastic Surgery Center, P.A.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously held in Linda Cowley v. Virtua Health System (A-47-18) (081891) that the “common knowledge” exception of the Affidavit of Merit Statute applies only when a simple negligence standard is at issue, and does not apply when a specific standard of care must be evaluated.  In this case involving if and how to reinsert a removed nasogastric tube, the Court reversed the judgement of the Appellate Division and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because she failed to submit an affidavit of merit within the time required by the Affidavit of Merit Statute.

Enacted in 1995, the Affidavit of Merit Statute requires that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases “provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The statute’s primary purpose “to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily [can] be identified at an early stage of litigation.” Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998). Failure to provide an affidavit or its legal equivalent is “deemed a failure to state a cause of action,” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29, requiring dismissal with prejudice.

An exception to this rule is the judicially-created “common knowledge” exception which provides that an expert is not needed to demonstrate that a defendant professional breached some duty of care “where the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence.” Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985). In those exceptional circumstances, the “jurors’ common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to determine a defendant’s negligence without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts.” Hubbard v.  Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 394 (2001). Thus, a plaintiff in a malpractice case is exempt, under the common knowledge exception, from compliance with the affidavit of merit requirement where it is apparent that “the issue of negligence is not related to technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of [the licensed] practitioner[].” Sanzari v.  Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 142 (1961).

On January 28, 2020, the Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”) Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) addressed a federal court’s January 23rd invalidation of certain provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) rule relating to the third-party requests for patient records. In Ciox Health, LLC v. Azar,[1] the court invalidated the 2013 Omnibus Rule’s mandate that all protected health information (“PHI”) maintained in any format (not just that in the electronic health record) by a covered entity be delivered to third parties at the request of an individual, as well as the 2016 limitation on fees that can be charged to third parties for copies of protected health information (“PHI”).

As enacted, HIPAA’s Privacy Rule limits what covered entities (or business associates acting on behalf of covered entities)[2] may charge an “individual” requesting a copy of their medical record to a “reasonable, cost-based fee”[3] (the “Patient Rate”). The Privacy Rule did not, however, place limitations on the fees that can be charged to other requestors of this information, such as other covered entities that need copies of the records for treatment purposes or for disclosures to attorneys or other third parties.  In order for some of these third parties to obtain the records, the patient would have to provide the covered entity with a valid HIPAA authorization.  

GenomeDx Biosciences Corp., which markets a genomic test (Decipher®) intended to assess the aggressiveness of prostate cancer, has agreed to pay $1.99 million to the U.S. Department of Justice to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.)(“FCA”) by submitting claims to Medicare for tests conducted to evaluate treatment options for men after prostate surgery.

The government and a whistleblower alleged that between September 2015 and June 2017, GenomeDx knowingly submitted Medicare reimbursement claims for the Decipher® test ...

The federal government continues to secure significant recoveries through settlements and court awards related to its enforcement of the False Claims Act (FCA), particularly resulting from actions brought by qui tam relators. In fiscal year (FY) 2016, the federal government reported that it recovered $2.5 billion from the health care industry. Of that $2.5 billion, $1.2 billion was recovered from the drug and medical device industry.  Another $360 million was recovered from hospitals and outpatient clinics.

Government Intervention Drives Recoveries

The FY 2016 FCA statistics ...

Our colleagues James P. Flynn, Paul A. Gomez, Purvi B. Maniar and Yael Spiewak of Epstein Becker Green have published a blog post on the Trade Secrets & Noncompete Blog that will be of interest to our readers: "Assignment Lessons: 8th Circuit Finds Assigned Non-Competes Enforceable — Under Certain Facts."

Following is an excerpt:

The 8th Circuit's recent decision in Symphony Diagnostic Servs. No. 1 v. Greenbaum, No. 15-2294, __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. July 6, 2016), upheld the enforceability of non-compete and confidentiality agreements assigned by Ozark Mobile Imaging to ...

In 2008, Ambac v. Countrywide defendants Bank of America Corporation and Countrywide Financial Corporation merged into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank of America.  In discovery, Bank of America withheld communications between Bank of America and Countrywide that occurred before the merger, on the basis that they were privileged attorney-client communications that were protected from disclosure under the common-interest doctrine.  In 2014, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, acknowledged that "New York courts have taken a narrow view of the common-interest ...

In its recent decision in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell,[1] the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Obama administration's payment of cost-sharing subsidies for enrollees in plans offered through the Affordable Care Act's Exchanges is unauthorized for lack of Congressional appropriation. The decision would affect future cost-sharing subsidies, though the court immediately stayed the decision pending its outcome on appeal.[2]

In its decision, the court found in favor of the members of the House of Representatives, based upon its ...

The U.S. Supreme Court has rendered a unanimous decision in the hotly-awaited False Claims Act case of Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar.  This case squarely presented the issue of whether liability may be based on the so-called "implied false certification" theory.  Universal Health Service's ("UHS) problem originated when it was discovered that its contractor's employees who were providing mental health services and medication were not actually licensed to do so. The relator and government alleged that UHS had filed false claims for payment because ...

On December 14, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the Texas Medical Board's ("TMB") motion to dismiss an antitrust lawsuit brought by Teladoc, one of the nation's largest providers of telehealth services.[1]  Teladoc sued the TMB in April 2015, challenging a rule requiring a face-to-face visit before a physician can issue a prescription to a patient.  Following two recent Supreme Court cases stringently applying the state action doctrine, this case demonstrates the latest of the continued trend where state-sanctioned boards of market ...

On November 24, 2015, in United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., No. 14-5210, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 24, 2015), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that federal False Claims Act ("FCA") liability cannot attach to a defendant's objectively reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous regulatory provision. While outside of the health care arena, this decision has implications for all industries exposed to liability under the FCA.

In Purcell, the government alleged that false claims had been submitted as a result of certifications made by defendant MWI ...

On Wednesday, October 14, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (the "Court"), Judge Rudolph Contreras, vacated the Health Resources and Services Administration's ("HRSA") interpretive rule on Orphan Drugs ("the Interpretative Rule") as "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."^[1]  As a result of the ruling, pharmaceutical manufacturers are not required to provide 340B discounts to certain types of covered entities for Orphan Drugs, even when the drugs are prescribed for uses other than to treat the rare ...

On December 15, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, a class action removal case.

In short, the Dart case is welcome news to employers. Standards for removing a case from state to federal court have been an abiding point of concern for employers faced with "home town" class actions. In more recent times, this problem has become a point of interest to employers in health care and other industries that are beset by cybersecurity and data breach cases originating in state courts but calling for the application of federal privacy ...